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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2524 
F. B. BAIN AND R. F. BA.IN~ P ART.NERS, TRADING AS 
L. F. BAIN AND SON, 
versus 
EDGAR BOYKIN. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Chief Justice anrl Jiistices of the Suprem,e Coitrt of 
Appeals of Virginia·: 
Your petitioners, F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trad-
ing as L. F. Bain and Son, respectfully represent that they 
are aggrieved by that certain judgment of the Circuit Court 
of Sussex County, Virginia (R., p?,ge 17, beginning at line 
7); entered against them on the 2nd_ day of May, 1941, in fa-
vor of the above styled defendant wherein the said court de-
termined that your petitioners, the plaintiffs in the said ac-
tion, take nothing by their suit and that the defendant recover 
his costs by him in said action expended, the said proceedingR 
by the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, being held 
pursuant to an appeal (R., page 2, beginning at line 26), from 
a civil warrant, which said appeal was prosecuted by the de-
fendant from the Trial Justice Court of .Sussex County, Vir-
g·irtia, and trial de novo had in said Oircuit Court. 
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FACTS AND PLEADINGS. 
A warrant (R., page 1, line 6) was issued in the usual man-
ner and form by J. L. Long, a justice of the peace of Sussex 
County, Virginia, summoning the defendant, :fildgar Boykin, 
to appear before William D. ·Prince, Trial Justice of Sussex 
County, Virginia, on a claim of the plaintiffs for the gross 
sum of $305.64, being· the sum of $209.76, with interest from 
the 8th day of July, 1930, fifteen ·per cent (15%) attor-
2* ncy's fees, subject, however, to a credit *of $20.00 as of 
April 4, 1931. The claim of the plaintiffs was evidenced 
by a bond (R., page 10, beginning at line 18), signed by Ed-
gar Boykin payable to the order of L. F. Bain and Son on 
demand after date. The bond was dated July 8, 1930, and 
was for the principal sum of $209. 76 and bore interest from 
the 8th day of July, 1930. The deputy sheriff of Sussex 
County, Virginia, served the process and misdirected the pa-
pers which were lost on the return date (R., pag·e 11, lines 8-
14), which was July 8th, 1940. On that date, the papers hav-
ing been lost (R., page 11, lines 8-14), the plaintiffs sued out 
a new warrant (R., page 1, line 25, page 2, lines 1-15), which 
was duly served and the defendant filed his plea of the statute 
of limitations (R., page 3, lines 7-22). Thereupon after trial 
the Trial Justice granted a judgment for the plaintiffs (R., 
pag·e 2, lines 15-23), defendant g·ave bond and noted an ap-
peal (R., pag-e 2, beginning at line 26). The case was duly 
docketed at the September term, 1940, of the Sussex Circuit 
Court (R., page A 3, beginning at line 21), (R., page 10, line 
11), at which time the defendant by counsel again undertook 
to appear specially and filed with permission of the court, his 
oral plea of the statute of limitations, which was stated to be 
the same as was embodied in his plea before the Trial ,Justice 
Court (R., page 3, lines 7-22). The plaintiffs proved their 
bond in evidence (R., page 10, lines 15-28) (R., page 11, lines 
1-4), and had present for such questions with reference to 
evidence as might arise, witnesses including the deputy sheriff 
who lost the papers and the plaintiffs' business manager, Mr. 
U. A. Holt. Upon the filing of the plea of the statute of limi-· 
tations, and t.he proof of the bond, the parties stated to the 
court that the only question involved was the question raised 
hv_ the plea of the statute of limitations (R., page 11. lines 
7 -9). The bond itself was not disputed in any wav. There-
npon the case was argued and submitted to the court on the 
question of the statute of limitations (R., page 11, lines 15-
16). At the conclusion of the argument, the court having in-
dicated its opinion that the plea of the statute of limitations 
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should be overruled, and judgment entered on the merits 
3* for the plaintiffs. >),Uonnsel for the defenctant asked leavo 
_ to file a memorandum of authorities on the question of 
the statute of limitations as applicable to this case (R., pag·e 
11, lines 17-20). Whereupon the court advised counsel that 
it would withhold its decision until the January term of court, 
during which time the defendant would have the opportunity 
of filing such brief or memorandum of authorities supporting 
his view as to the statute of limitations as he might desire 
to submit (R., page 11, lines 20-23). Defendant never filed 
any further brief as to the statute of limitations (R., page 
12, lines 5-6). 
At the January term of court defendant appeared by coun-
sel after submission of the case on the statute of limitatiorn; 
and offered to file (R., page 13, lines 1-3) his pleas in abate-
ment which are set out in the record in this case '(R., page a, 
beginning at line 23, to page 11, line 16). Plaintiffs objected 
and moved the court to reject said pleas on the ground that 
the same had not been seasonably tendered, and on the ground 
that the case had been submitted and heard by the court and 
that final judgment was only being held up to permit the de-
fendant to file a memorandum of authorities on the question 
of the statute of limitations, the sole issue under the evidence 
and pleadings on which the case was tried, and on the further 
ground that under Virginia law, no plea in abatement could 
be received after the defendant had pleaded in bar, and fur-
ther, after defendant had in spite of his protestations ap-
peared generally and in fact gone through the · trial of his 
case to the point that it had been submitted to the court sitting· 
to determine all questions of law and facts (R.., page 13, lines 
3-20); that by his pleadings, his appearance, the trial and 
submission of his case, he had waived all matters set up in 
his said pleas; and on the further ground that the pleas in 
abatement refer to and undertake to set up as a defense Vir-
ginia Code, Section 4722 (1), which provides that no person 
nor corporation shall conduct or transact business in this state 
under any assumed or :fictitious name, etc., which sub-section, 
and the language of the pleading filed indicating that the 
4• first paragraph thereof •is being· pleaded, is not ap-
plicable to partnerships, sub-section one dealing· only with 
individuals and corporations tradi112,· uucler as.;.;umed name~, 
and requiring each person or corporatio1i doing business in 
Virginia at the time of the enactment of the statute under an 
assumed or fictitious name to immediately comply with the 
"foregoing provisions". The court overri1led t11e motion to 
reject said ·plea and permitted the same to be filed (R., page 
/ 
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13, lines 21-23), to which the plaintiffs duly excepted. At 
the subsequent trial of the case plaintiffs moved the court to 
strike the said plea basing the motion on the same grounds 
previously assigned in their motion to reject, which motion 
the court overruled, to which action of the court the plaintiffs 
duly excepted (R., page 13, lines 23-28). Thereupon trial of 
the matter was had on the plea in abatement filed by the de-
fendant. Neither side introduced any evidence (R., page 14, 
lines 1-3). Following the arg11Illent of the attorneys for the 
defendant, counsel for the plaintiffs recited to the court the 
previous proceedings in the cause whereunder the case had 
been set for trial and trial had, and the case submitted to the 
court for its decision, the sole and only defense being· based 
upon the plea of the statute of limitations, the subsequent ap-
pearance of defendant at a later term of court pending the 
court's decision then being held up for the filing of a brief, 
and the tender of this new issue under a plea in abatement, 
the motion to reject the plea, the motion to strike the plea, 
and the rulings of the court thereon. Counsel for the plain-
tiffs at that time stated to the court that under the circum-
stances and because of the reopening of the case for new 
issues after defendant had rested and closed his case, that 
he had reached a point at which he was somewhat confused 
as to where he was in the case and as to when the case was to be 
regarded as closed and ready for the court's decision, in view 
of the fact that the case had in effect been twice tried (R., 
page 14, lines 16-25). Plaintiffs' counsel then stated that he 
would like to have an expression and an understanding as to 
the stage at which the proceedings were at that time, and 
5* specifically whether or not he *could regard the case as 
ready for the court's decision after hearing the remainder 
of the argument (R., page 14, lines 25-28) (R., page 15, lines 
1 and 2). ·whereupon the court said words to this effect: 
'' All right, gentlemen, don't let us have any misunder-
standing on this phase of the matter now. As I understand 
it, the onlv thing which is before me is this plea. in abate-
ment which you have filed here. I am definJtely ruling against 
the defendant on his plea of the statute of limitations, and I 
hold that the appearance here is general and not special and as 
I 1mderstand it now, we are ready for a decision on the case 
following the remainder of the argument and the only thing 
hefore me is this plea in abatement. Is that right, Mr. Pul-
ieyf Is that rig·~1t, Mr. BurU" (they being counsel for the 
defendant) (R., pag·e 15, lines 4-15), to which remarks coun-
sel for the defendant in effect. stated that the position of the 
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court was correct (R., page 15, lines 16 and 17). Thereupon 
counsel for the plaintiffs renewed his motion to strike the 
plea in abatement and asked the court to enter final judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs, on the gTounds previously as~ 
signed and upon the further ground that the burden of prov-
ing any non-compliance, if any, with Section 4722 was upon 
the defendant and no evidence having been adduced before 
the court whatsoever as to whether or not there had been 
any compliance with said section or any certificate filed in 
the Clerk's Office, the court had before it nothing· upon which 
it could base a judgment sustaining the plea in abatement, 
and under the law and facts to enter judgment for the plain-
tiffs (R., page 15, lines 17-28). ·whereupon the court over 
the vigorous objection of the plaintiffs g-ranted a continu-
ance of the case to the first dav of the March term in orde1· 
to allow the defendant an opportunity to prove whether or 
not any certificate had been filed in the Clerk's Office under 
Section 4722 (1) of the Code, to which action of the court the 
plaintiffs by counsel excepned (R., pag·e 15, line 28) (R., page 
16, lines 1-5). 
On the 12th day of March, 1941, the trial of this case was 
again heard on the plea in abatement at which time the 
6* plaintiffs filed *their replication to said plea in abate-
ment which is made a part of the record (R., page 16, 
lines 6 and 7) (R., page 6, beginning at line 17, R., pages 7, 
8, 9). Thereupon the court permitted the defendant to call 
the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virgfoia, as 
a witness, to which action of the court the plaintiffs duly ex-
cepted. The Clerk testified that the plaintiffs had not filed 
any certificate in his office under Section 4722 (1) of the Code 
of Virginia, prior to November 1940; that he had no book in 
his office in which to record any ·such certificates; that ap-
proximately seven years ag:o a salesman had tried to sell him 
such book but that he had had no use for it and did not buY 
it; that since the first of December, 1940, a number of such 
certificates had been filed in his offi~e, but that he still did uot 
have a book in which to record the same and that the same 
were being held on file in his office; that on the :~0th day of 
November, 1940, F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trading 
as L. F. Bain and Son, did file in his office a certificate which 
is required of partners under section 4722 (1); that independ-
ently of such certificate, that a reference to the records in hi~ 
office, with special reference to the judgment lien docket. 
the deed books, the will books, it could he ascertained that F. B. 
Bain and R. F. Bain were partners trading as L. F. Bain and 
Son; that he knew that the firm L. F. Bain and Son had been 
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in business for longer than sixty (60) years; that the firm 
was originally composed of L. ~,. Bain and P. D. Bain, his 
son; but that he did not know whether or not other children 
of L. F. Bain and Son had ever had any interest in the firm 
or had been partners therein; that F. B. Bain was a son of 
L. F. Bain and R. F. Ba.in a son of P. D. Bain (R., page 16, 
lines 6-28). 
Upon the completion of the testimony, the court again heard 
argument of counsel on the plea in abatement, and plaintiffs' 
motion to strike the said plea in abatement and to enter judg-
ment for the plaintiffs on the law and the evidence, defendant 
having failed to submit further authority on his plea of the 
statute of limitations (R., page 17, lines 1-4). The court 
7* thereupon took the matter under *advisement and on the 
2nd day of May, 1941, entered the judgment complained 
of, to which ac~tion of the court the plaintiffs by counsel duly 
excepted ( R., page 17, lines 7 -28; R., page 18, lines 1-6). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
(1) That the court erred in reopening the case after the 
defendant had in effect admitted the validity of the bond-(R., 
page 11, lines 7 and 8) and after the case had been admitted 
to the court for its decision on the question of the statute of 
limitations (R., pag·e 11, lines 15-16) for the purpose of per-
mitting· the defendant to interpose an entirely new defense as 
set up in his plea in abatement with reference to the certifi-
cate ref erred to therein. 
( 2) That the court erred in refusing to reject said plea and 
in refusing· to strike said plea, the same not having been sea-
sonably tendered, and the case having been theretofore tried 
and submitted to the court. 
(3) That the said plea is a plea in abatement and therefore 
the court erred in permitting the defendant to file the same 
after the defendant had pleaded in bar and by his appearance 
and statements to the court, admitted the validity of the bond 
upon which this action is based. · 
( 4) That the court erred in refusing to reject and strike 
said plea on the ground that the said plea undertook to set 
111J a defense to plaintiffs' aetion based on the idea tht1t the 
plaintiffs were amenable to paragraph 1 of Section 4722 (1), 
which deals solely with individuals and corporations trading 
under assumed or :fictitious names, at no place the defense 
having been raised or pleaded that the plaintiffs were ·required 
under paragraph 2 to file a certificate as co-partners. 
( 5) That the court erred in refusing to reject said plea and 
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enter judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that by 
8* his *pleadings, appearance and statements to the court, 
the defendant had. waived all matters set out in his said 
plea. 
( 6) That the court erred in permitting and granting a con-
tinuance of this case from the 8th day of ~.,elJruary, during 
the January Term of court to the March Term, in order to 
permit counsel for the defendant to take evidence after they 
had submitted the case to the court the second time and after 
counsel for the defendant had made the statement embodied in the record on page 14 beginning at line 17 and continuing· 
on page 15 through line 2, and after the court had definitely 
ruled that the trial was at an end upon the conclusion of ar-
gument as embodied in its statement contained on page 15, 
beginning at line 4 and continuing through line 15, and after 
counsel for the defendant had denn~tely rested their case and 
submitted it to the court as indicated in their remarks affirm-
ing the position of the court, as set out on page 15, lines 16-
17. Such continuance, especially in view of the preceding 
procedure in this case, constituted an abuse of any discretion 
which the court may have had. 
(7) That the court erred in refusing to hold under plain-
tiffs' replication to the plea in abatement, first, that Section 
4722 (1) is unconstitutional, second, in refusing to hold that 
at the time of the making of the said bond or contract, the 
payee, L. F. Bain and Son, was not a fictitious firm or trade 
name, used by F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, as contemplated 
by the statute referred to in said plea in abatement; third, 
in its refusal to hold that F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, part-
ners trading as L. F. Bain and Son, had at the time of the 
execution of said bond and at the time of the institution of 
suit thereon and at the time of the trial thereof, registered, 
filed and recorded all necessary information, data and certifi-
cates designated in said section referred to in said plea in 
abatement (see R., page 16, lines 11-18); fourth, and in re-
fusing to hold that the plaintiffs, L. F. Bain and Son, had 
9,s, done all things *necessary to be done by them, if any, 
under Section 4722 (1), and in refusing to hold that saicl 
L. F. Bain and Son had legal existence, and that they could 
lawfully and legally bring and maintain this action in the 
name of the said plaintiffls; fifth, in refusing to hold that Sec-
tion 4722 (1) did not apply to the plaintiffs in any respeet 
under the pleadings and evidence in this action; sixth, and 
in refusing to hold that the said section did not refer to or 
place any oblig·ations upon partnershiJ18 who were in business 
prior to the enactment of Section 4722 (1), and that the com·t 
J 
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further erred in holding by its judgment that the plaintiffs 
were required to file and record a certificate in a book which 
did not exist. 
* AR,GUMENT. 
With respect to the first assignment of error, we respect-
fully submit that in the trial of actions at law there is a ~tage 
in the proceedings at which all pleas must be filed. When these 
pleas are filed, and replied to, then issue is joined and the 
trial is ready to prooeed. The Virginia Statute makes boun-
tiful provision for the defendant's rights when Section 6107 
provides that '' any party in any action, at all stages of the 
pleadings, may plead as many several matters, whether of 
law or fact, as he shall think necessary". It will be noted 
that the statute in express terms provides that this may be 
done at any stage of the pleadings, and not at any stage of 
the trial. 
Section 6104 provides for the amendment of pleadings. 
This section provides : 
'' In any suit, action, motion or other proceeding hereafter 
instituted, the court may at any time in furtherance of justice, 
and upon such terms as it may deem just, permit any pleading 
to be amended or material supplemental matter be set forth 
in amended or supplemental pleadings.'' 
It will be noted that this section limits the remedies and re-
lief therein provided for to amendments and amended or sup-
plemental pleading·s, having obvious reference to amendments 
and matter supplemental to pleadings already filed. 
By exclusion, these statutes do not permit the :filing of a 
new plea, setting· up a new def euse, and requiring a new trial. 
We respectfully submit that the law of Virginia pleading 
and practice is so universally in accord with the maxim that 
the end of all litigation is repose, that without the necessity 
of the citation of authority, our system of pleading and prac-
tice does not permit a defendant to try his case on one plea 
and at the conclusion thereof having ascertained that he has 
lost, to then come into court and file another plea, and be 
a warded a new trial on that. Were such system permitted, 
there would be no end to litigation. 
It will be noted in this case, that no plea of the general 
issue was ever filed or tendered; that defendant first 
11 '*' rested on his plea *of the statute of limitations. Upon 
the court intimating that it would rule adversely on this 
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plea after hearing the evidence and argument, the defendant 
at a later date, undertakes to set up an entirely new defense, 
and through what we contend was an erroneous ruling 01 
the trial court, succeeded in procuring a second trial of his 
case. 
This action of the trial court was taken arbitrarily, without 
the assignment of a single ground or reason for defendant's 
lack of diligence in filing his pleas. 
W'ith reference to the second assignment of error, the plea 
tendered, as will appear from the record (R., page 3, line 26), 
was a plea in abatement. The plaintiffs objected and moved 
to reject the plea, on the grounds set out on page 13, begin-
ning at line 3 of the record, one of which grounds was that 
under the Virginia law, no plea in abatement could be received 
after the defendant had pleaded in bar. Section 6105 of the 
Code of Virginia refers, first, to pleas in abatement for want 
of jurisdiction, and then provides that no such plea or any 
other plea in abatement shall be received after the defendant 
has demurred, pleaded in bar, etc. The language of this stat-
ute is positive and mandatory. If the defendant desired to 
interpose the defense set up in said plea in abatement, it was 
his duty to set up said defense in a proper plea. If he elected 
not to file the plea of the general issue, and not to plead the 
matter therein contained during the stage of the trial allotted 
for pleadings, and if he elected to file· a plea which is ex-
pressly prohibited by the Virginia statute, then he is bound 
by his election and the court erred in permitting the defend-
ant to file the plea in abatement tendered, setting up the de-
fense alleged under Section 4722 ( 1) of the Code of Virgfoia. 
With respect to assignment of error #3, we respectfully 
submit that the stage of the trial for pleadings had elapsed 
when the court began the trial on the evidence; that issue iu 
this case was joined on defendant's plea of the statute of 
limitations (R., page 3, beginning at line 7) ; that the plea of 
the statute of limitations admits the capacity of the 
12• plaintiffs to sue; admits the proper existence *and lfi-
gality of the bond and undertakes to avoid payment 
thereof by a plea of the statute of limitations. That the posi-
tion taken by the plaintiffs is correct is conclusively settled 
on page 11, line 7 of the record, which shows that the parties 
stated to the court upon the filing of the plea of the statute of 
limitations that the only question involved was that raised 
under this plea. 
For convenience, and because of their relationship, we wil1 
next take up assignment of error #6. It will be recalled that 
.on November 30, 1940 (R., pag·P. 1.0, line 12), a trial of 
_J 
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this case was had on the issue joined upon the filing of de-
fendant's plea of the statute of limitations, that thereafter at 
the following term of the court (H., page 13, line 1), the de-
fendant appeared and tendered his pleas in abatement; that · 
the court overruled the motion to reject said pleas and per-
mitted the same to be filed (R., page 13, line 20). Then on 
F1ebrua.ry 8, 1.'941, after overruling· plaintiffs' motion to strike 
the said pleas (R., page 13, line 26), another trial was had 
on the pleas in abatement (R.., page 14, line 1). At this time, 
for some reason, which has never been explained in the trial 
and does not appear in the record, the defendant undertook 
to try this issue on his ba.re plea without in any respect in-
troducing any evidence whatsoever to support it. The court 
heard th~ argument of the attorneys for the defendant on this 
plea (R., page 14, line 4). Whereupon plaintiffs' counsel, 
naturally desiring at this time to reach an end of the litiga-
tion and to submit the case to the court finally for its de-
cision, made the statement set out on page 14, beginning at 
line 4 of the record, in which he recited the previous pro-
ceedings in the case. Counsel for plaintiffs then asked for 
a clarification as to the stag·e of the proceedings which had 
been reached, desiring to be sure tba t the defendant had this 
time submitted his case for final determination by the court, 
and specifically asked the court to rule as to whether or not 
he could regard the case as finally submitted for its decision 
with nothing remaining· to be done but the conclusion of the 
argument (R., page 14, beginning at line 28, continuing on 
page 15). 
13* *In response to this inquiry, we have the definite, 
forthright, une11uivocal ruling of the court as set out 
on page 15, beginning at line 4. And in addition we have the 
absolute confirmation of the court's statement bv both the 
counsel for the defendant (R., page 15, beginning at line 16). 
Thereupon the argument of counsel for the plaintiffs was re-
newed and completed and it was pointed out to the court that 
no evidence had been adduced before the court whatsoever 
upon which it could base a judgment for the defendant (R., 
page 15, line 24). 
The court then, in direct conflict with its previous ruling, 
upon which the plaintiffs feel they had an absolute right to 
rely, granted a continuance to tbe defendant in order to per-
mit him to introduce in evidence the testimony of Jesse Har-
grave, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia 
(R., page 15, line 28). This continuance as will appear from 
the record, was granted without the assignment of a single 
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solitary reason therefor, with no reason or excuse, justified 
or unJustified, for the failure of the defendant to introduce 
his evidence during the trial .of his case. 
We understand the law in Virginia to be that whether or not 
a case will be reopened for the admission of additional (:Vi-
dence, is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
for good cause shown. As said in the case of Bertha Zinc 
Company v. Martin, 93 Va. 809, 
'' The question of allowing the introduction of evidence after 
the parties have announced that they are through, or after 
the case has been submitted to the jury, rests in the sound 
discretion of the court and its action will not be held erroneous 
unless it appears that in the exercise of that discretion it has 
plainly erred.'' 
In this particular case, 3:11 expert witness was called. 
The court said: 
"The parties :it: * * should not be allowed to introduce ex-
pert evidence after both sides have announced that they are 
through with their evidence and further steps have been taken 
in the case, except under very extraordinary circumstances 
and for good cause.'' 
In this case, of course, we do not have expert testimony, 
but the matter raised in the plea was raised by the defenchmi 
and set up matters which he knew or should have known must 
be proved. The mere fact that he failed to introduce 
14* the evidence is not such good cause *or extraordinary 
circumstances as to entitle him to a continuance of his 
case to the following term of the court, after having twic~ 
submitted it to the court for its decision. . 
In the case of Wilkie v. Richrnond Traction Co., 105 Va. 
290, the trial court refused to allow the introduction of addi--
tional witnesses after the evidence for both plaintiff and de-
fendant had been closed, and its action was approved in the 
opinion by this court, on the ground that" No reason is shown 
for not having introduced the witnesses to testify in chief. 
It. is not said tliat tbev were nbHent or sirk nor that there was 
any surprise, acciclerit or mi8take, nor any reason wlmtever 
given why their introduction as witnesses was delayed''. 
In this case we have set out some of the reasons entertained 
by a Virginia -Court on a motion or application of a party 
for permission to introduce evidence after tbe evidence for 
both sides bad been closed. 
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The fact stands out that the conditions of the case and re-
opening of the case in order to permit the defendant to take 
his evidence, was done without the assignment of any reason 
whatsoever. 
In the case of George, et als., v. Pilcher, et als., 28 Gratt. 
310, it is said: 
'' On trials before a jury when the evidence has been closed 
on both sides and the argument of the case has commenced, 
as a general rule, no further evidene.e should be received from 
either party; but the J"udg·e presiding at the trial in the ex-
ercise of a sound discretion may relax the rule under peculiar 
circumstances and receive additional evidence, if the nature 
of the case and the ends of justice require it." 
It will be noted that the general rule forbids the introduc-
tion of the evidence. ·vv e take it that the burden is upon the 
party offering the evidence to show good cause why the evi-
dence was not introduced regularly during the trial of the 
case, and that such evidence is necessary in order to establish 
the nature of the particular case of the evidence neglected to 
be introduced and to establish whether or not the ends of jus-. 
tice require the introduction of the additional evidence, and 
that this good cause must be before the court in order 
15* for it to exercise its sound discretion. In this *case, we 
submit that the court arbitrarily granted the continu-
ance with no reason being· i;;hown why it should have been 
~ranted, and that therefore the discretion exercised by the 
trial court was an arbitrary discretion and not a sound dis-
cretion. 
In Volume 54, Corpus .Juris, pages 158, 159, paragraph 179, 
we find among others, the following statements: 
'' A motion to reopen a case for the purpose of introducing 
further evidence in the case is addressed to the sound dis-
cretion of the court, the exercise of which is not subject to 
review unless there has been abuse thereof * * ~. While the 
exercise of the court's discretion should not be hampered 
by unreasonable eonditions, such discretion is judicial and 
not arbitrary * * * where a good reason is given for the prior 
omission to introduce evidence, the request to reopen should 
ordinarily be granted. And, on the other hand, if the mov-
ing- party fails to show good cause for reopening th~ case, it. 
is a proper exercise of discretion to refui-;c to permit him 
to do i::;o." 
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We submit that under the circumstances existing in this 
case, that the reopening of the case was arbitrary and not 
judicial, no reason having been assigned for the failure of 
the defendant to introduce his evidence, and he having al-
ready bad the equivalent of two trials of his case. 
The Virginia rule is followed in Corpus ,Juris, Volume 64, 
page 163, paragTaph 182 : 
'' On trials before a jury, when the evidence has been closed, 
on both sides, and the arg11mcnt of the case has commenced, 
as a general rule, no further evidence should be received 
from either party, but the judge presiding at the trial in the 
exercise of a. sound discretion, may relax the rule under 
peculiar circumstances.'' 
The case of Geor_qe, et als. v. PilchP.r, et als., is cited as the 
sole authority for this rule. 
We submit that the same rule should apply in a trial be-
fore the court where the case l1as been fully arg·ued and sub-
mitted, as was true in this instance. As will appear from the 
rule set out above, such a case should only be reopened un-
der peculiar circumstances. The peculiar circumstances, we 
take it, are reasons why it should be opened, or reasons why 
the evidence was not offered in the trial of the case. No 
peculiar circumstances are shown in this case. 
· In the case of Crai,q v. Jones, 252 S. W. 574, a. Ken-
16"' tucky case, *it was held that th~~·e was no substantial 
error in the refusal of the court to set aside the submis-
sion and open the case after it had been argued and sub-
mitted a.nd the court bad indicated orallv from the bench his 
conclusions upon the evidence. The proposed evidence was 
such as should by reasonable diligence have been produced 
on the hearing·. There was no reason why it could not have 
been introduced on the hearing bv due diligence. To have 
opened the case on the grounds shown would have been an 
a.buse of discretion on the part of the Circuit Court. 
In the case of Y ou .. n,gs v. Y oiings, 196 S. W. 795, wl1ich was 
decided in the Supreme Court of Iowa, the evidence in the 
cause was ta.ken on November 4th, and 5th, 1920. In Decem-
ber, the argument was concluded a.nd the case fully submitted 
and taken under advisement by the court. On April 3, 1921, 
the plaintiffs moved the court to open the case and grant 
them permission to offer testimony to the effect that the sig-
nature to the letter Exhibit '' C'' was a. forgery, which was 
refused. The motion was based upon a lack of knowledge of 
the evidence at the time, oversight, inadvertence and mis-
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take. The court held that the appellants failed to show 
proper diligence to discover the evidence which they sought 
to introduce. 
In the case of H ottghton v. Laughton, 218 Pac. 475, decided 
by the District Court of Appeals for Cal., it was held that 
defendant's offer to introduce further evidence upon issues 
which had theretofore been determined bv the trial court 
came at a belated hour. Tbe court in its opi,nion cited Con-
solidated Nationa.l Bank v. Pacific Coast Steamship Company, 
95 Cal. 1, as follows: 
'' The action of trial court in refusing to reopen an action 
after tlic close of the trial, for the purpose of allowing in-
troduction of additional evidence, is not an abuse of discre-
tion where there is no showing of any excuse for not having 
produced tlle evidence at the trial." 
In the case of Hargerle v. Beebe, 99 N. W. 303, decided by 
the Supreme Court of Iowa, the court said in part: 
'' Referring· to the reopening· of case, which order is vigor-
ously complained of bv plaintiff's counsel, we find that 
17* the case was fullv *submitted to the court in March of 
the year 1902. Thereafter at the September term, 1902, 
the court announced from the bench that he had been unable 
to make up his mind and that either side would be permitted 
to produce further testimony. Defendant took some depo-
sitions, plaintiff moverl to suppress these depositions, but his 
motion was overruled. In .January, 1903, the court heard 
other witnesses orally.'' 
The court assmned to reopen the case long after final sub-
mission upon its own motion. This was entirely irregular 
and without authority in law. ( Citing- Dunn v. Wolfe, 81 
Iowa 688, Stein v. Roller, 68 N. ·vv. 1087, Farmers Bank V. 
Griffity, 2 "Wisc. 447, the court said: "The depositions taken 
ufter the case was reopened should have been suppressed 
and the court was in error in receiving·- the oral testimony 
adduced on the so-called second hearing.") 
W"ith respect to assignment of error #4, as will appear 
from the rec9rd in this case, the plaintiffs are partners. If 
any part of the section 4722 (1) paragraph 1 or 2 applies 
to it, it is paragTaph 2. Defendant's plea is directed to. para-
µ;raph 1 and sets up the defense that L. F. Bain and Son is a 
fictitious firm or trade name, and that L. F. Bain and Son: 
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had not filed and recorded in the Clerk's Office the fictitious 
trade name in compliance with Section 4722 (1). 
"\Ve respectfully submit that the fictitious or assumed name 
portion of said statute applies to individuals trading un~er 
assumed names and to corporations trading under assumed 
names and that that portion of the said statute does not in 
any way apply to co-partners. The fact that the plaintiffs 
are co-partners and any duties incumbent upon them under 
paragraph 2 -of the said section is not raised. 
It is necessary that the defendant both plead and prove 
the defense upon which be relies. There are numerous cases 
so holding. The law as embodied in these is clearly set out 
in 45 A. L. R., page 270 to page 278, subdivision VIII. 
Assignment of error #5 raises the question as to whether 
or not any failure to file a certificate of any kind by the plain-
tiffs under Section 4722 ( 1). was not waived by the de-
18* fendant by his plea of the *statute of limitations and the 
trial of his case thereon, by his statement to court (R., 
page 11, line 7) that no other question was involved in the case, 
and by I1is failure to plead the defense in the first place. 
In Burk's Pleading and Pra.ctice, page 105, parag-raph 51, 
we find the following statement of the law which we respect-
fully submit is applicable in this case: 
'' Both in Virginia and elsewhere all pleas must be pleaded 
in due order * * * and failure to plead in that order is a 
waiver of those that should liave ·been previously pleaded.'' 
There are a number of cases on this point decided under 
various partnership and assumed name statutes from other 
states: 
In the Oregon case of Benson v. Johnson, 165 Pac. 1001, it 
was held that such a statute requiring registration is waived 
by failure to object to the bringing of the action by answer 
or demurrer. 
In the case of Bryant v. Wellbanks, 263 Pac. 332, the court 
held: 
"The law appears to be that in an action by an individual 
or partnership, within the statutes, compliance with statu-
tory provisions relating· to the doing of business under as-
sumed or :fictitious names, or designations, not showing the 
names of the partners, need not be alleged by the plaintiff, 
but that non-compliance is a matter of defense, and that ot,. 
jection to the legal capacity of the plaintiff to sue based on 
J-
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this ground must be raised in some appropriate way, as by 
demurrer if the incapacity appears on the face of the com-
plaint or petition, or by answer, or plea in abatement, or the 
objection will be waived.'' 
'' The objection must be taken by demurrer if the groul).d 
for it appears on the face of the complaint, or by answer if 
they do not, otherwise it is waived. There seems to be no 
other tenable position to hC' taken on the question an9. this 
court bas su'bstantially so held.'' 
In the case of Cook v. Fowler, 35 Pac. 431, the point wa!:I 
made that the complaint show(lcl that the plaintiffs were co-
partners under a desig1rntion not showing the names of the 
iJersons interested as partners and that they had failed to 
aver or prove a compliance with the provisions of the statute. 
The court held : 
"The point is not well taken. The failure to make, file, 
and publish the certificate in question is a matter of defense, 
to be set up by defendants, and not having been so taken, is 
waived." 
In the case of Paff v. Ottinger, 163 Pac. 231, it was 
19* contended *bv the defendants that the trial court erred 
in its refnsai to allow them to file an amended answer, 
wherein they, allege for the first time, a. lack of legal capacity 
in the plaintiffs to sue arising out of their alleged failure to 
comply with the statute relating to the filing of certificates 
of partnerships; the court held: 
"These have alwayg been held to be dilatory pleas, which 
are waived by the failure in the first instance to plead them.'' 
In the, South Dakota case of Drake v. Great Northern Rail-
way, 123 N. "\V. 84, following· the general authority, this is 
the court's languag·e relative to a plea. setting up a defense 
on a failme to comply to a similar st.atute: 
'' Conceding, therefore, that a court would have the right 
upon proper application to relieve a party from the effect 
of such waiver upon good cause shown, it c.ould hardly he 
contended that an amendment such as we find in the case at 
.har, would be in furtherance of justice. ,Vhile there are 
certain pleas in abatement which should be looked on with 
favor, because, thoug·h interposed at a lnte hour, they may 
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tend to the reaching of exact justice, yet it must be conceded, 
we think, that in a case of the kind, where the question in 
abatement goes to the right of the plaintiffs to bring the snit, 
because they have not complied w'ith some statutory provi-
sion unknown to the common Jaw, and tbe compliance with 
wl1ich in no manner affects the justice of the cause of action, 
the trial court, would clearly have abused its discretion in 
allowing such a plea.'' 
In tlie case of Schu.ltz v. Nickle, 231 N. W. 575, it was held 
that where notice of defense raising plaintiff partnership's 
failure to file statutory certificate, was not given with pleri 
of general issue, defendant wa.ived such defense. 
In the case of Rowland v. National Reserve, 246 Pac. 210, 
(Oregon), the court held : 
''Not having in the first instance pleaded the lack of filing 
a certificate of an assumed name the defendant waived that 
defense.'' 
The court further said: 
''Pleas in abatement are not favored in la.w and the pro-
cedure respecting them should be strictly construed.'' 
As stated in the case of Canonica v. St. George, 64 Mont. 
200: 
'' An allegation that plaintiff has complied with the sta~te, 
is not any pa.rt of the statement of his cause of action; on the 
contrary, failure to comply is a matter of defense which must 
be specially pleaded in the answer, or it is waived." 
20• *The case of Thelan v. 'Phelan, 188 Pac. 40 (Idaho), 
is a case involving the leg·al capacity to sue. The court 
held that the defendant having taken no objection upon this 
ground either by demurrer or answer, the respondent must 
be deemed to have waived the same. 
See also 45 A. L. R., pages 270 to 278 for an extended dis-
cussion of this question. 
Assignment of error #7 raises the question of the consti-
tutionality of this Section 4722 (1) of the Code. If the inter-
pretation is to be placed on this section of the Code, to-wit: 
4722 (1), as was placed on it in the decision of the trial court 
in this case, the statute is unconstitutional in that it holds 
plaintiffs guilty of a crime without complying with section 8 
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of the Virg-inia Constitution, and violates Section 11 of the 
Virginia Constitution in depriving· them of their property 
without due process of law. The court's judgn1ent ascertains 
in a civil suit that they are guilty of a crime. We submit 
that it can only be constitutionally determined that one is 
guilty 0£ a crime by a proper trial and conviction under the 
criminal laws of the Commonwealth. The statute as inter-
preted inflicts upon them a penalty never provided for by the 
Legislature, to-wit, the forfeiture of their rights to recover 
money honestly due them by a defendant who has received 
the benefits thereof and now while retaining the benefit of 
the contract, seeks to avoid it. 
We submit that tSection 4722 {1) violates the provisions of 
Section 42 of the Virginia. Constitution in undertaking to em-
brace more than one object. In the first place, it deals with 
persons or corporations doing business under assumed or 
fictitious names. It then undertakes to deal with an entirely 
different subject, namely, the filing· of a certificate by co-
partners, taking this subject out of Chapter 175 A of the 
Code of Virg'inia dealing with general partnerships and mak-
ing it paragraph 2 of Section 4722 (1) of the Virginia, Code, 
when ParagTaph 4722 deals with the unrelated subject of 
driving automobiles while intoxicated and paragraph 4722 (2) 
switches to stamping newspapers. The section *then be-
21 * ing continued with its subsections in a chapter with ref-
erence to trust combinations and monopolies. We sub-
mit that the inclusion in the paragraph of regulations for 
filing birth and death certificates would have been equally 
as proper and equally as improper. 
Finally we submit that the act as construed by the trial 
court herein iR unconstitutional because it violates Section 9 
of the Constitution of Virginia imposing cruel and unusuaJ 
punishment. 
See Paragon Oil Svndicate v. Rhodes Drilling Compmiy, 277 
S. W. 1036~ in which the identical question l1ere raised is fully 
discussed. It was there held tha.t failure to ·file the certificate 
by partners did not render the contract unenforceable be-
cause of the Bill of Rig·hts embodied in the Texas Constitu-
tion, paragraph 17, thereof, containing· much of the identical 
langua~C' of our_ sect.ion~ 9 and 11 of the Virginia Constitu-
tion. 
ThiE-- statute and the decision of the court interpreting it 
places another burden on hundreds of business houses in 
Virginia operated by its best citizens who by virtue of the 
failure of the Commonwealth t11rough its prosecutiuo· of-
ficers and CommiRsioners of Revenue to enforce it, an~l the 
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secluded and hidden place it occupies in the Acts of Assem-
bly and Code of Virginia, have known nothing of it. At the 
same time it places in that class of citizens who seek to avoid 
their honest obligations another means of dodging their debts 
within the law. 
Assignment of error #7 also raises the question as to 
whether the name L. F. Bain and Son is a fictitious trade 
name. 
There are numerous cases on this subject. 
In the case of Sau.er v. McClintic-Marshall Construction 
Omn.pany, 146 N. "\V. 422, it is soll)ewhat in point with the case 
here. In that case a partnership consisting· of three brothers, 
did business under a firm name composed of the full name of 
one of them, followed by the words "and Company", and had 
filed a certificate giving the names of the members of the 
22* firm. One of the members retired from *the firm and 
the business was continued under the same name with-
out the filing of a new certificate. The court held that the 
failure to file a new certificate did not bother right of ac~ 
tion. 
In deciding this case, the court said : 
'' Construing· this statute with the evil sought to be cor-
rected in mind, the courts have inclined to the view that a 
firm name which gives the true names, or surnames, of its 
members, is .not assumed or fictitious, within the meaning of 
such a statute, even though the baptismal name of each mem-
ber may not be stated." 
Continuing· in its opinion the court said: 
''In the Sauer case, the identity of C. A. :Sauer, the head 
of the firm, is directly pointed out by the firm name. Both 
members of the firm are named Sauer.'' 
In the Bain case, it has been common knowledge in Wake-
field for seventy years, who L. F. Bain was. He was the 
original head of the firm, its founder. There was little dif~ 
ficulty in anyone within miles of this community, ascertain-
ing· who the son of L. F. Bain was, and ascertaining who werE~ 
his successors in business. As stated in the Sauer case, both 
members of the firm were named Bain. 
See also MP-rrill v. Caro lnvestm.ent C01npfl.ny, Inc., 70 
Wash. 482, 127 Pac. 122; Hale v. City Carriage and Transfer 
r.ompany, 119 Pac. 837; 45 A. L. R., pages 258 to 266, sub-
division VI. 
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Assignment of error #7 in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 raises 
i:p. geri~ral terms the question as to whether or not the filing 
of a" certificate prior to the trial of the case is a substantial 
compliance with the law enabling· plaintiffs to sue even ~f 
the court should bold that they are required to do so and 1f 
the court should decide ag·ainst them on the other assig'Il-
ments embodied herein. 
There is a eonflict of authority on this point. 
In 45 A. L. R., page 246, we find the following statement 
relative to the- law on this point: 
"TIME OF COMPLIANCE ·wrTH STATUTE AS AF-
FECTING QUESTION; COMPLIANCE AF·TEH. BEGIN-
NING OF ACTION. There is a conflict of authority and 
some difference of opinion apparently between the earlier 
and later decisions even in the same state in several instances., 
·on the question whether the certificate required by the stat~ 
utes must be filed and publication completed before the action 
may be begun, or whether it is sufficient if there is com-
23• pliance before the trial. The majority *rule seems to be 
in favor of the latter view, that compliance with the 
statute is not a condition precedent to the right to begin the 
action but tllat compliance at a later period, as before trial, 
or the interposition of a plea in abatement or motion for non-
suit~ is sufficient.'' 
This assignment also rah;es the question of plaintiffs' status 
under this law with reference to co-partners. This firm has 
,been in business for more than sixty years. The Clerk of 
the Circuit ,Court of Sussex County has no book in which to 
record such a certificate. It does 
0
not app~ar from tl1e evi-
dence when this partnership was formed. It does not ap-
pear when the Clerk of the court took office. Is the clerk's 
testimony as set out on pag·e 16 of the record, beginning at. 
line 7, sufficient for this court to say beyond a reasonable 
doubt that plaintiffs are g·uilty of a crime, and that no cer-
tificate has ever been tendered any clerk of the Circuit Court 
of Sussex County, Virginia, for filingT 
The Colbert case, 11 S. E. 2nd, 616J was based entirely on 
the first paragraph of Section 4722 (l) which provides as 
follows: 
'' Each sucl1 person or corporation now doing business in 
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Virginia under an assumed or :fictitious name shall imme-
diately comply with the foregoing provision.'' 
The fact that this provision was left out of the paragraph~ 
dealing with co-partners indicates the iritention of the Leg~ 
islature to deal diffcrentlv with the two classes of business 
enterprises. "\Ve submit that this intention may have been 
that partnersl1ips then in existence were not to be within its 
provisions. Certainly it was the intention of the Legislature 
in not including this provision which is embodied in the as-
sumed and :fictitious name part of the statute dealing with 
Boston Bargain Houses and Ashland .Construction Com-
panies, that co-partners then in business should not be rig·or. 
ously required to "immediately comply with the foregoing 
provision.'' If not required to comply immediately then the 
obvious intention was that their contracts were not to be 
void. 
The Legislature surely had something in view, in not say-
ing to partnerships existing· at the time of the enact-
24 * ment of the law *that they must immediately comply 
when individuals and corporations trading under as-
sumed or :fictitious names are expressly required so to do. 
·what was the Legislative intent? 
In the case of Neinieyer v. Wright, 75 Va. 243, it is said: 
'' That legislatures do not think the rule one of universal 
obligation, or that, upon grounds of public policy, it should 
always be applied, is very certain. For, in some statutes, it 
is said in terms that such contracts are void; in others, that 
they are not so. In one statute there is no prohibition ex-
1wessed, and only a penalty; in another, there is prohibition 
und penalty, in some of wl1ich contracts in violation of them 
are void or not, according· to the subject matter and object. 
of the statute; and there are other statutes in whicl1 there 
are penalties and prohibitions, in which contracts made in 
contravention of them will not be void, unless one of the par-
ties to them practices a fraud upon the ig11orance of the other. 
It must be obvious, from such diversities that statutes for-
bidding· or enjoining things to be clone, with penalties ac-
eording·ly, should always be fully examined, before the courts 
should refuse to give aid to enforce contracts which are said 
to be in contravention of them.'' 
We submit that plaintiffs <'onld not he convicted of a mis-
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demeanor under the law, pleadings and evidence in this case, 
and since that is the case, the entire defense interposed by 
the defendant falls, and that the judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed and final judgment entered in this court 
for tbe plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioners respectfully contend and submit. that the 
judgment of the lower court in this case sl1ould be reversed: 
that the c.ase should be remanded to the trial court for a new 
trial, on all points and/or judgment should be entered in 
this court in favor of the plaintiffs for the foregoing reasons 
assig·ned; and respectfully pray tl1at they be awarded· a writ 
of error pending the review of the record by this court, and 
tl1at this petition may be read in addition as your petitioners' 
opening brief for which 8aid petitioners intend it. 
A copy of this petition has been mailed to Mr. Frank P. 
Pulley, Jr., at Waverly, Virginia, and to Mr. W. Stanley Burt, 
at Claremont, Virgfoia, who were the attorneys appear-
25* ing for the defendant in the *trial before the Circuit 
Court of Sussex County, Virginia, and said copies of 
this petition were mailed to them on the 27th day of August, 
1941. 
Counsel for your petitioners desire to state orally the rea-
sons for reviewing: the decision and action of the lower court 
hereinbefore complained of and will present this petition to 
the Honorable Edward W. Hudgins at ·Chase City, Virginia, 
on the 28th day of August, 1941. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. B. BAIN AND R. F. BAIN, 
Partners trading as L. F. Bain and Son, 
by CARLTON E. HOLLADAY, 
T. N. CRYMES, 
CARLTON E. HOLLADAY, 
T. N. CRYMES, 
Attorneys for petitioners. 
*ATTORNEYS' CERTIFICATE. 
Counsel. 
We, the undersigned attorneys, practicing before the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our 
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opinion the judgment complained of in the foregoing peti-
tion is erroneous and should be reviewed and reversed hv the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. ~ 
Given under our hands this 27 day of August, 1941. 
Filed 8-28-41. 
CHAS. W. DAVIS, 
JUNIU,S W. PULLEY. 
E. W. HUDGINS. 
September 10, 1941. Writ of error awarded by the court. 
Bond $300. 
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M.B.W. 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County: 
F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trading as L. F. Bain 
and Son 
v. 
Edg·ar Boykin 
NOTLCE OF APPEAL. 
To Messrs. Frank P. Pulley, Jr. and W. Stanley Burt: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That on the 21 day of June, 1941, 
at ten o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as we may be heard 
at the Courthouse of Sussex County, Virginia, at Sussex, 
Virginia, the undersigned will present to the Honorable Rob-
ert W. Arnold, Judge of the Circuit Court of 1Sussex County, 
Virginia, who presided over the trial of the above mentioned 
ease in the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, on No-
vember 30, 1940, February 8, 1941, and March 12, 1941, sit· 
ting to determine all matters of both law and facts, a jurr 
being waived, a report and certificate of a11 the testimony 
and other incidents of the trial in tl1e above ca.se to be au-
thenticated and verified by him. 
And also that the undersigned will, at the same time and 
place, request the Clerk of the said court to make up and 
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deliver to counsel a transcript of the record in the above en-
titled cause for the purpose· of presenting the ~a~e. with a 
petition to the Supreme ·Court of Appeals of Virgnna for a 
writ of error and supersedeas therein. 
F. B. BAIN .A.ND R. F. BAIN, 
partners trading as L. F. Bain 
and Son 
By CARLTON E. HOLLADAY, 
Counsel. 
page. A-2 ~ Service accepted this 4 day of June, 1941. 
page A-3 ~ Virginia: 
FRANK P. PULLEY, JR., 
W. STANLEY BURT, 
Attorneys for the defendant. 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County: 
F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trading as L. F. Bain 
and Son 
v. 
Edgar Boykin 
BH it remembered that the following warrants were issued 
by J. L. Long, a Justice of the Peace of the County of Sus-
sex, Virginia, and executed according. to the returns thereon; 
and that the defendant filed his plea of the statute of limita-
tions, and his oral plea in abatement in the Trial Justice 
Court, setting up the defense that under .Section 4987 (h) of 
the Code, the Trial Justice was without jurisdiction to try 
said warrant at the Courthouse of the County, Wakefield, 
Virginia, being a nearer place to the defendant, and in his 
magisterial district, and the Trial Justice being required to 
· sit in Wakefield by order duly entered by the Judge of the 
Circuit Court of this county; and that trial was had thereon 
on ,T uly 22, 1940, and judgment granted thereon as herein set· 
out; that thereupon on Ju]y 30th, 1940, the defendant noted 
and perfected his appeal to the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County; and that the action thereupon was du]y docketed in 
the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, and that tho 
following· pleas were before the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County, Virginia, on the 10th day of September, 1940, subse-
quent pleas being filed as indicated in the record. 
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page 1 ~ REGORD. 
Virginia: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Sussex County, at 
Courthouse of said County, on the 10th day of September, 
1940: 
Virginia: 
County of SusRex, to-wit: 
To Sheriff or any constable of said County: 
I hereby command you, in the name of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, to summon Edgar Boykin,. if to be found in your 
. district, to appear at the courthouse at Sussex, Virginia, in 
said county on the 8th day of ,July, 1940, at 10 :30 o'clock A. M. 
hefore William D. Prince, Trial Justice of the said County 
to answer the complaint of F. B. Bain and R. iF. Bain, part-
ners trading and doing business as L. F. Bain and Son, upon 
a claim for money for the sum of Two Hundred and nine and 
76/100 Dollars subject to c1~edit of $20.00 4-4-31 ($209.76) 
with interest less said credit thereon from the 8th day of July, 
1930, till paid, due by bond and 15% attorneys fees as pro-
vided in said bond, and then ~nd there make return of this 
warrant. 
Given under my hand this 29th day of June, 1940. 
J. L. LONG, .Justice of Peace. 
Executed within the county of Sussex, state of Virginia, 
this 29th day of June, 1940, by_ delivering· a true copy of the 
within summons to Edgar Boykin in person. 
T. B. FANNIN, Sheriff 
by H. L. HARRIS, llis deputy 
·nrginia: 
County of Sm;~ex, to-wit: 
To T. B. Fannin, Sheriff of said county, 
I hereby command you, in the name of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, to summon Edgar Boykins, if to be 
page 2 ~ found in your district, to a.ppear at Sussex, Vir~ 
ginia, in said County on the 15th day of July, 1940, 
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at 10 :30 o'clock A. M. before William D. Prince, Trial tT ustice 
of the said County to answer the complaint of F. B. Bain and 
R. F. Bain, partners trading as L. F. Bain and Son, upon a 
claim for money for the sum of Two Hundred Nine and 
76/100 Dollars ($209.76) plus 15% attorneys fee~, with in-
terest thereon from· the 8th day of July, 1930, till paid, due 
bv bond and then and there make return of this warrant. 
~ Given under my lrnnd this 8th day of July, 1940. 
OLGA REM:ORENKO, 
Clerk, Trial Justice 
This bond is subject to a credit of $20.00 as of 4/4/31 
Executed in Sussex County, Virginia, this 8th day of J"uly, 
1940, by delivering a true copy of the within notiice to Edgar 
Boykins in person. 
T. B. FANNIN, 
Sheriff of Sussex County, Virginia 
F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trading as L. :B,. Bain 
& Son 
v. 
Edgar Boykin 
IN DEBT. 
22nd day of July, 1940 
Judgment, that the plaintiff recover of the defendant Edgar 
Boykins Two Hundred Nine and 76/100 Dollars ($209.76) 
with interest from the 8th da.y of July, 1930, till paid, plus 
15% attorneys fees, and $2·.50 for his cost. 
OLGA REl\tIORENKO, 
Clerk, Trial Justice 
This judgment is subject to a credit of $20.00 as of 4/4/31 
This day, .July 30th, 1940, came before me in person the de-
fendant, Edgar Boykins, and perfected bis a.ppeal by giving 
bond in the sum of $800.00 with F. P. P.J,llley, ,Jr. 
page 3 ~ as surety, whereby the said bond and surety was 
accepted and the appeal grnnted, and the papers 
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herein this day certify to the Clerk of Circuit Court of Sus-
sex County, Virginia. 
WM. D. PRINCE, T. J. 
July 30th, 1940 
F. B. Ba.in and F. T. Bain, partners trading as L. F. Bain 
and Sons 
v. 
Edgar Boykins 
PLEA OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says that 
the supposed cause of action in the warrant in this action 
mentioned, is founded upon a bond, that being an instrument 
under seal,, and that said bond is alleged to be due and pay-
able by virtue of law on July 8, 1930, and is, the ref ore, barred 
hy the statute of limitations to actions, e. a. Virginia Code 
Section 5810, action not having1 been commenced on said bond 
within ten years from the due date thereof or the date when 
such right of action accrued to the plaintiff, in manner and 
form as said plaintiff hath complained against him. And 
this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
FRANK P. PULLEY, JR., p. d. 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County: 
And, at another day, to-wit: January 14, 1941, the defend-
nnt after submission of the case on the statute of limitations 
filed his plea in abatement, in the words and :fig11res follow-
ing·, to-wit: 
The said· defendant, in his own proper person, comes and 
says that this court ought not to have or take any furthe1· 
cognizance of the action aforesaid of the said plain-
page 4 ~ tiff, because the said defendant says that the sup-
posed cause of the said action is based upon an 
alleged bond or contract executed by the defendant payable 
to the said L. F. Bain and Sons, dated July 8, 1930, in whicl1 
the defendant promised to pay the said L. F. Bain and Sons 
Two Hundred Nine and 76/100 ($209.76) Dollars plus 15% 
attorney fee and interest thereon until paid; whicl1 said bond 
or contract the said def end ant alleges is void, illegal and un-
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inforcible because of the fact that at the time of the making 
of the said bond or contract the said payee L. F. Bain and 
Sons was a fictitious firm or trade name used by the said 
F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, or some other persons unknown 
to defendant trading as such, since they had not at the time 
registered, filed and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Cir-
cuit Court of Sussex ·County, Virginia, in compliance with 
Virginia Code Section 4722 (1), and for that reason the said 
plaintiff cannot recover under the alleged contract; a.nd fur-
ther, that the said plaintiff, F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, or 
some other persons unknown to plaintiff trading as such, 
trading as L. F. Bain and Sons, had not reg-istered, filed and 
recorded in the Clerk's Office of Sussex County, Virginia, 
the said fictitious trade name in compliance with Virginia 
Code Section 4722 (1) on or before July 8, 1940, the time of 
the institution of this suit, and, therefore, had no leg·al ex-
istence and could not legally or lawfully bring or maintain 
this action in the name of the plaintiff as aforesaid, since no 
such plaintiff lawfully existed under the laws of the state 
of Virginia. And this the defendant is ready to verify. 
Wherefore he prays judgment whether this court can or 
will take any further cog·nizance of_ the action afore said. 
EDGAR BOYKIN 
page 5 ~ State of Virginia, 
County of Sussex, to-wit : 
This day Edgar Boykin personally appeared before me, 
Irma K. Howell, a Notary Public, in and for the County afore-
said, in the State of Virginia, and made oath that the matters 
and things stated in the foregoing plea are true. 
Given under my hand this 14 day of tT anuary, 1941. 
My commission expires April 9, 1942. 
IRMA K. HOWELL, 
Notary Public. 
And, at another day, to-wit: ·February 8th, 1941, the de-
fendant filed his plea in abatement, in the words and figures 
following, to-wit: 
The said defendant, by counsel, comes and says that this 
court ought not to have or take any further cognizance of 
the action aforesaid of the said plaintiff, because the said 
defendant says that the warrant or summons in this action 
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summoned the defendant to appear at Sussex, Virginia, in the 
County of Sussex, on the 15th day of July, 1940, at 10 :30 
A. M. That by virtue of Virginia Code Section 4987 (h) the 
Trial Justice has no authority or jurisdiction to summon the 
defendant, Edgar Boykin, who lives in W ake:field Magisterial 
Dif.',trfot, near the Town of \V akefield, Virgi.nia, to appear at 
Sussex, Virginia, and thereby has no jurisdiction to try such 
action at Sussex Courthouse ; but is confined to summoning 
the said defendant in this instance to appear at the Trial 
Justice Courtroom at vVakefield, Virginia, that being a place 
designated for the Trial ,Justice to sit by order of the Cir-
cuit Court of Sussex. County, and the nearest of such places 
to where the defenflant resides. Therefore, the 
page 6 ~ summoning of the defendant in this instance to ap-
pear at Sussex, Virginia, and to trial of the subp 
ject matter of the action at 1~fossex ·Courthouse is void, the 
Trial Justice having no jurisdiction to try the said action at 
any place except Wakefield, Virginia, as designated in the 
aforesaid court order. The Circuit Court's order designat-
ing· the places for the trial ,Justice to sit a.nd he~r and try 
cases under the law is here vouched. Therefore, this def end .. 
ant says that the Trial Justice Court in thh~ case, and the 
Appeal Court, the Circuit Court of Sussex County, i1, without 
jurisdiction to hear or try this case upon tho papers as they 
now exist; and this defendant says that the judgment ren-
dered by the Trial Justice Court in tl1is case is void. 
W}wrefore, he prays judgment whf}ther this court can or 
,vill take any further cognizance of the iwf:ion aforesaid. 
FJDGAR BOYKIN 
By FRANK P. PULLEY, JR., 
Couw,;el 
And. at another day, to-wit: March 11, 1941, tho pfointiffs 
filed their replication to plea in abatement, in the wordH and 
figures following, to-wit: 
The said plaintiffs, by their attorney, coma and Hay that 
notwithstanding anything by said defendant in ]lis plea al· 
leged, this court ought not to be precluded from taking fur-
t11er cog·nizance of this action as pleaded in said plea in abate-
ment because they say: 
(1) That said Section 4722 of the Code of Virginia is un-
constitutional, and in conflict with and derogative to the con· 
~titution of the State of Virginia and of tlrn United States 
of America. 
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(2) That at the time of the execution of the bond 
page 7 ~ sued upon and at the time the ma.teri.als and goods 
for which said bond was given were furnished, the 
defendant knew the names, residences and p!nce:; of bu sines~ 
cf F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, trading· as L. i1,. Bain and Son, 
aud who composed 8aid firm in every respect. 
( H) 'fnat said defendant has enjoyed t.1v~ b,~ndit of such 
goodH and estoppecl to deny liability therefor. 
( 4) Because at the time of the making· of the said bond or 
contract the payee L. F. Hain and Son were not a fictitiou:; 
firm or trade name, used by F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain as 
contemplated by the statute referred to in said plea in abate-
ment. 
( 5) Because said •F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trad-
ing as L. F. Bain a.nd Son had at the time of the execution of 
said contract and at the time of the institution of suit thereon 
and at the time of the trial thereof registered, filed and 
recorded all necessary information, data and certificate desig-
nated in said statute referred to in said plea .in abatement. 
( 6) because the said plaintiffs trading· as L. F. Bain and 
Son have done all things necessary to be done by them, if any, 
under Section 4722 (1) and have leg-al existence and can 
lega1ly and lawfully bring and maintain this action in the 
name of the plaintiffs. 
(7) Because Section 4722 (1) obviously does not apply to 
tlrn~e plaintiffs in any respect. 
(8) Because the firm of L. F. Bain and Son has been in 
existence for 90 years and has been comprised of the same 
firn1 mP.mbers for more than twenty years; that the part-
ners plaintiff acquired a vested right in the name of L. F. 
Bain and Son prior to tbe enactment of the statute and could 
not be deprived thereof by legislative enactment; that the 
firm of L. F. Bain and Son, composed of the pres-
page 8 ~ ent partners, having been in business prior to 1922~ 
the statute could not. be retroactive but must be 
held to be prospective only; that such was the intention of 
the legislature is manifest bv a consideration of the whole 
of Section 4722, Section 1 thereof dealing with individual 
persons and corporations trading under a~ assumed. With 
reference to these, it is expressly provided: 
"Every such person or corporation now doing business in 
Virginia under an assumed or fictitious name; shall imme. 
diately comply with the foreg·oing· provisions.'' 
That such was not the intention of the Legislatnre in deal-
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ing with partnerships is evidenced by the fact that no such 
requirement as to partners then engaged in bm.dness was ~m-
bodied in the statute. The intention of the Legislature is 
inescapable when individual persons and corporations then 
trading under assumed or fictitious names are specifically re-
quired to comply immediately and when such requirement is 
omitted wii:h reference to co-partners. 
(9) That the bond upon which this action is based consti-
tutes a.n executed negotiable instrument and is not subject to 
the provisions of the statute. 
(10) That there is no book now available, nor has there 
been any book available in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit 
Court of Sussex County, Virginia, in which county the plain-
tiffs conduct their business, wherein any certificate which 
might 1be filed or recorded under Section 4722: may be or could 
he recorded. 
(Jl) That in any event justice and equity would requite 
that the plaintiffs be permitted to recover on an implied con-
tract based ·upon the familiar doctrine of quantitin m.eruit. 
page 9 } .And thii:; the plaintiffs are ready to verify. 
F. B. BAIN AND R. F. BAIN, 
partners trading as L. F. Ba.in 
and Son 
By CARLTON E. HOLI..I.Li\DAY, Counsel 
State of Virginia, 
County of Sussex, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Amie Lee Cobb, 
a Notary Public of and for the' county of 1Sussex in the state 
of Virginia, the undersigned Carlton E. Holladay, who, first 
being duly sworn, says that he is the agent and attorney for 
the above named plaintiffs and that the matters and things 
8et forth in the foreg·oing· replication are true a.nd correct. 
(Signed) <JARLTO~ E. HOLLADAY 
Personally subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th dav 
of Marc]1, 1941, in my stat.e and county aforesaid. · 
AMIE LEE COB-B, 
Notary Public 
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page· iO ~ RECORD. 
A report and certificate of all the testimony together with 
all the motions, objections and exceptions on the part of the 
respective parties, the action of the court in respect thereto, 
and all other incidents of the trial of the case of F. B. Bain 
and R. 1F'. Bain, partners trading as L. F. Ba.in and Son, 
tried in the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, on 
November 30, 194.0, February 8, 1941, and March 12, 1941, 
before the Honorable Robert W. Arnold, Juclge of said court. 
jury being waived. 
Present: :M:r. Carlton E. Holladay, counsel for plaintiffs. 
Messrs. Frank P. Pulley, Jr. and W. Stanley Burt, for de-
fendant. 
·This case was duly docketed at the September term, 1940, 
of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia. It was set 
for· trial on the 30th day of November, 1940, at the office of 
the J udg·e in Waverly, Virginia, by agreement of counsel. 
The plaintiffs appeared and proved in evidence their bond 
evidencing· the debt upon which they .based their action, in 
the following words and figures, to-wit: 
Wakefield, Va., July 8, 1930 
$209.76 
On demand after date I promise to pay to the order of L. 
F. Bain and Son, Wakefield, Virginia, Two Hundred Nine 
and 76/100 Dollars ($209.76) for value received, with inter. 
est from July 8,. 11930, until paid. We, each of us makers ancl 
endorsers, hereby jointly and severally waive the benefits of 
the Homestead Exemption Laws and Bankrupt Laws as to 
this debt obligation or contract, and also waive all legal no-
tices. In the event this debt is collected by attorney or court 
officer the cost of the same shall be added and paid by us, 
makers and endorsers. 
page 11 ~ Witness my hand and seal this 8th clay of July, 
1930. 
EDGAR BOYKIN (iSeal) 
$20.00 Receive this note 
Twenty and no/100 Dollars 
4/4/1931 L. F. Ba.in and Son-K 
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which bond was admitted in evidence and made a part of 
the record. The defendant stated that he was appearing 
specially and orally pleaded the sta.tute of limitations as set 
forth in his plea theretofore filed in the Trial Justice Court. 
'rhe parties stated to the court a.t this time that the only 
question involved was that raised under the plea of the stat-
ute of limitations. H. L. Harris, deputy sheriff of Sussex 
County, testified that the warrant dated on the 29th day of 
June, 1940, and issued by J. L. Long, J·ustic.e of the Peace, 
was duly served by him, his return duly made, and that he 
lo~·t the papers .by misdirectin~: them to the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, instead of the Trial 
'"Tustice. The parties then argued the case by counsel on the 
question presented in issue and submitted the case to the 
Court for its decision. The court having indicated its opinion 
that the plea of the statute of limitations should be over-
ruled a.nd judgment entered for plaintiff on the merits, de-
·f endant asked leave to file a memorandum of authorities sup-
porting his view tha.t his plea should be sustained. There-
upon the court advised counsel that it would withhold his 
decision until the January term of court during which tim~ 
defendant would have the opportunity to 1fi1e his memoran-
dum. of authorities. On November 30, 1940, after the close 
of the proceedings in this case, during tl1e trial of another 
case, the defendant stated to the court that he desired to file 
a plea in abatement embodying the same defense set up in 
the plea in abatement filed :B,eb. 8, 1941~ as to the jurisdic-
tion of the Trial .Justice Court under .Section 
page 12 ~ 4987 (h) of the Vir!!_inia Code, the plaintiff ob-
jt~cterl and the court staterl that he would hear 
defendant's counsel on their offer to file suc]J plea at the 
.T anuary term of Court. 
The defendant did not file a brief on tl1e statute of limita-
tions. 
page 13 ~ .At the Jmmary term of the Circuit Court of 
Sussex County, the defendant appeared and pre-
sented bis pleas in a.batement, which are set out in the rec-
ord. Plaintiffs objected and moved to reject said pleas on 
the grounds that they had not been seasonably tendered; that 
the case had been submitted and J1eard by the court, with 
final judg·ment only being held up to permit the defendant to 
file a brief on the question of the statute of limitations; that 
under the Virginia law no plea in abatement could be re-
ceived after the defendant had pleaded in bar; that the de-
fendant had in spite of his protestations appeared generally 
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and had in effect gone through the trial of his case and sub-
mitted the same to the court sitting without jury to determine 
all questions of law and fact; that by his pleadings, appear-
ance, the trial and submission of his case, to the court, he 
had waived all matters set up in said pleas in abatement; 
and further on. the ground that the plea in abatement refers 
to and undertakes to set up ns a defense to plaintiffs' action, 
plaintiffs' failure to comply with Virginia Code Section 
4722 (1) which deals solely with individuals and corpora-
tions trading· under assumed names and not with co-part-
ners. The court overruled the motion to reject said pleas 
and permitted the same to be filed. To which action of the 
court the plaintiffs duly excepted. At the subsequent trial. 
of the case on said 1jlcas in abatement on February 8th, 1941, 
which trial was Jiad by agreement at the office of Frank P. 
Pnlley, .Jr. at ·waverly, Virg'inia, the plaintiffs moved thl! 
court to strike the said pleas on the same grounds previously 
assigned in their . motion to reject, which motion the court 
overruled. To which action of the court the plain-
page 14 ~ tiffs duly excepted. Thereupon trial of the mat-
ter was had on the pleas in abatement filed by the 
defendant, neither side introducing any evidence on said pleas 
at the trial thereon. Following the argument of the attor-
neys for the defendant, counsel for the plaintiffs recited to 
the court the previous proceedings in the ca.use, whereunder 
the case had been duly docketed at the September term, 1940, 
and set for trial on November BOth, 1940; the trial of the 
case on that date on the defendant's plea of the statute of 
limitations as the only defense to said action interposed on 
behalf of the def end ant; the withholding of the court's de-
cision to permit defendant to file his brief on the question 
of the statute of limitations; defendant's failure to file such 
a brief, the appearance of defendant at. the January term of 
said court and the injection of tl1e new issues raised by the 
pleas in abatement; the motion to reject the plea, the motion 
to strike the pleas and the rulings of the court thereon. Coun-
sel for plaintiffs then stated to the court that under the cir-
cumstances, and because of the fact that one trial of the mat-
ter had then alreadv been had and that the close of another 
was approaching, aiid in view of the fact that plaintiffs had 
at the conclusion of the previous trial been under the im-
pression that defendant had rested his case and submitted it 
to the court; that counsel for plaintiffs had reached the point 
at which he was confused as to where he was in the case and 
"as to w11en the case was to be regarded as closed and ready 1 
for the court's decision. Plaintiffs' counsel them stated that 
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lie would like to have an expression from the court and an 
understanding as to the stage at. which the proceedings were 
at that time, and specifically whether or not he 
page 15 ~ could regard the case as finally submitted to the 
. court for its decision with nothing remaining to 
be done but the conclusion of the argument. Whereupon the 
court stated words to this effect: 
'' .All right, gentlemen, don't let us have any misunderstand-
ing on this phase of the matt.er now. As I understand it, the 
only thing which is before me is this p]ea in abatement under 
Section 4722 {L). I am definitely ruling against the defend-
ant on his plea of the statute of limitations and also on his 
plea as to the jurisdiction of the Trial Justice to hear this 
case at the courthouse of the county. I hold defendant's 
appearance here is general and not special, and as I under-
stand it now the case is submitted to the court and we are 
ready for a decision on this case following the remainder 
of the argument and the only thing that is before me is this 
plea in abatement. Is that right, Mr. Pulley? Is that right, 
.Mr. Burt?'' 
To which remark counsel for the defendant in effect stated 
that the statements of the court were correct. Thereupon 
counsel for the plaintiffs, in concluding his argument, re-
newed his motion to strike the plea in a.batement and asked 
that judgment be entered for the plaintiffs on the grounds 
previously assigned and on the further ground that the bur-
den of proving non-eompliance, if any, with Section 4722 was 
upon the defendant and no evidence having been adduced be-
fore the court whatsoever as to whether or not there had been 
any compliance with Section 4722 (1) Va. C. that the court 
had nothing before it upon which it could base a judgment 
for the defendant on sajd plea, and upon the law anp. facts 
before it, judgment should then be entered for plaintiffs. 
Whereupon, over the objection of plaintiffs, the 
page 16 ~ court continued the case to the March term, 1941, 
in order to allow the defendant an opportunity to 
prove whether or not any certificate had been filed in the 
Clerk's Office under 1Section 4722 (l) of the Code. To which 
Action of the Court the plaintiffs by counsel excepted. 
On the 12th day of March, 1941, tl1e plaintiffs filed their 
replication to said plea. in abatement. Thereupon the court, 
over the objection and exception of the plaintiffs, called the 
. rnerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, as a 
witness. The Olerk testified tlrnt the plaintiffs had not filed 
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any certificate in his office under Section 4722 (1) of the Code 
of Virginia prior to November 30, 1940; that on that date they 
had filed such certificate; that he had no book in his office 
in which to record such certificate under the statute; that 
approximately seven years ago, a salesman had tried to sell 
him such book, but that he had had no use for it a~d did not 
buy it; that since December l:st, 1940, a number of suc.h cer-
tificates had •been filed in his office but that he still did not 
have a book in which to record the same; that the same were 
_being held in his office; that independently of such certifi-
cates the deed books and judgment record$ would show that 
F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain were partners trading as L. F. 
Bain and Son; that he knew that the firm of L. F. Bain and 
Son had been in existence mor.e tha.n si."'\:ty years; that the 
firm was originally composed of L. F. Bain and P. D. Bain, 
his son, hut that he did not know whether or not other chil-
dren of L. F. Bain had ever had anv interest in the firm or 
had been partners therein; that F. B: Bain was a son of L. F. 
· Bain and R. F. Bain a son of P. D. Bain. 
page 17 ~ The court then ag·ain heard a.rg-ument on all is-
sues raised by said plea and the replication there-
to, and upon plaintiffs' renewed motion to strike the pleas 
and to enter judgment for the plaintiffs. Whereupon the 
court took the matt.er under advisement and on the 2nd day 
of May, 1941, entered the following judgment and order: 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and the de-
f~ndant, by his attorney having filed a plea in abatement of 
this action on the grounds that the plaintiff, at the time of 
the execution of the note by the defendant which is the basis 
of this action, and at the time of the bringing of this action, 
was transacting· business in this state under an assumed or 
fictitious name without having complied with the provisioni:; 
of Section 4722 (1) of the Code of Virginia, 1936, by signing 
and aclmowledgiug- a certificate setting forth the names of 
each and every person or corporation owning the same, with 
their respective post-office and residence addresses, and filing 
the said certificate in the office of the Clerk of Court in which 
deeds are recorded in the countv wherein the business is con-
ducted. ·· · · 
And the court ha.ving heard arguments ot' the attorneys for 
the parties on the facts and the law, and having· maturely 
considered the same, does sustain the said plea and dismiss 
the said action at the costs of the plaintiff. To which action 
of the court the plaintiffs, by counsel duly excepted. 
Thereupon the plaintiffs signifying a desire to apply to 
F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, etc. v. Edgar Boykin. 37 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of 
error and a su.pe1·sedeas, it is ordered that the execution of 
this judgment be suspended for a period of sixty (60) days 
from this date, if such petition is ac.tually filed 
page 18 ~ within the specified tim~ when said plaintiffs or 
someone for them Ahall give or file a bond in the 
Clerk 'R Office of this court with surety to be approved by the 
Judge of this court or the Clerk thereof in the penalty of 
$100.00 conditioned according· to Section 6338 and/or Sec 4 
tion 6351 of the Code of Virginia. 
page 19 r JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I~ Robert vV. Arnold, Judge of the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County, Virginia, who presided over the foregoing trial of 
the case of F. B. Bain and R. F'. Bain, partners trading as 
L. F. Bain and Son, v. Edg·a.r Boykin, in said court in Sussex 
County, Virginia, on November 30, 1940, February 8, 1941, 
and March 12, 1941, sitting to determine all matters of both 
law and fact, a jury being waived, the case being heard 
under appeals of warrants for small claims fron:t first to last 
do certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy and 
report of all the evidenc,e, together with all the motions, ob~ 
jections, and exceptions on the part of the respective parties, 
the action of the court in respect thereto, all the evidence, 
together with all the motions, objections, and exceptions on 
the part of the respective parties, the action of the court in 
respect thereto; and all other incidents of the said trial of 
the said cause, with the motions, objections, and except.iong 
of the respective parties as therein set forth. 
I do certify further that the attorneys for the defendant 
had reasonable notice, in writing, given by counsel for the 
plaintiffs, of the time and place when the foregoing report 
of the exhibits, exceptions and other incidents of the trial 
would be tendered and presented to the undersigned for sig-
nature and authentication, and that the said report was pre-
sented to me on the . . . . day of May, 1941, within less than 
sixty days after the entry of the final judgment and order in 
said cause. 
Given under my hand this 25 day of June, 1941. 
ROBERT W. ARNOLD, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County, Virginia 
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pag·e 20 ~ I, Jesse Hargrave, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of Sussex County, Virginia, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing is a copy and report of the testimony, the ex-
hibits, exceptions and other incidents of the trial of the case 
of F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, partners trading as L. F. Bain 
and Son v·. Edg·ar Boykin, and that the original thereof, and 
said c·opy; duly authentica.tecl' by the Judge of said court were 
lodged and filed with me as Clerk of the said court on the 
1st day of July, 1941. 
Clerk's fee: $5.00. 
Stenographer's fee: $10.00. 
,JESSE HARGRAVE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County, Virginia 
I. .Jesse Hargrave, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a true tran-
script of the record in the case of F. B. Bain and R. F. Bain, 
partners trading as L. F. Bain and Son, v. Edgar Boykins, 
lately pending in said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the attorneys for the defendant 
received due notice thereof, and of the intention of the plain-
tiffs to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for a writ of error and s1,,17ersedeas to the judgment therein. 
Teste: 
JESSE HARGRAVE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County, Virginia 
.TE.SSE HARGRAVE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sussex 
County~ Virginia 
A Oopy-Teste: 
:M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
INDEX TO RECORD 
Pag·e 
Petition for Writ of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Record ............................................. 23 
Notice of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Warrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Judgment, Trial Justice .............................. 26 
Appeal to Circuit Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Plea of Statute of Limitations ........................ 27 
Plea in Abatement ................................... 27 
Replication to Plea in Abatement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Report of Testimony, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Judge's Certificate ................................... 37 
Olerk 's Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
